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This commentary considers the Supreme Court’s recent judgement in Greater 
Glasgow Health Board (Appellant) v Doogan & Another (Respondents) and 




The appeal in Doogan1 concerned two midwives employed as Labour Ward 
Co-ordinators in the NHS in Scotland (the ‘respondents’). Their role entailed a 
number of tasks including the admission of patients, the allocation of staff and 
the supervision and support of other midwives.  They objected to these tasks 
in connection with patients undergoing terminations of pregnancy. They 
asserted a ‘right’ of conscientious objection under section 4(1) of the Abortion 
Act 1967 (as amended).  That section is framed in negative terms and reads: 
 
‘(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no person shall be under any 
duty, whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to 
participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a 
conscientious objection’ 
 
The conscience section is further limited by section 4(2)2 that provides: 
 
‘(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall affect any duty to participate 
in treatment which is necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent 
injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman’ 
 
The respondents were unhappy with the arrangements made to address their 
objections and mounted a grievance against their employers.  They 
subsequently brought judicial review proceedings against the Health Board 
(the ‘appellant’).  The respondents were unsuccessful before the Lord 
Ordinary in the Outer House of the Court of Session3 but succeeded on their 
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appeal before the Extra Division of the Inner House4 who granted a 
declaration that the scope of section 4(1) included ‘the entitlement to refuse to 
delegate, supervise and/or support staff in the provision of care to patients’ 
undergoing terminations save as required by s 4(2)’.  The difference between 
the Outer and Inner Houses rested on the interpretation of ‘to participate in 
any treatment authorised by’ the Abortion Act 1967.  The Outer House 
adopted a narrow interpretation whereas the Inner House adopted a wide 
interpretation that extended section 4(1) to ‘any involvement in the process 
of treatment, the object of which is to terminate a pregnancy’. 
 
The Health Board brought an appeal to the Supreme Court and Lady Hale 
gave the sole judgement that was formally agreed by the other four judges 




 The only question was the meaning of the words ‘to participate in any 
treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious 
objection’.5 
 The House of Lords judgement in the Janaway case6 did not specifically 
consider what those words meant in the context of hospital treatment.7  
 Human rights’ issues – for example, the right under article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights to refuse to perform employment 
duties as a manifestation of religious belief - give rise to difficult questions 
relating to an employer’s aims/ means that are context specific.  As such, 
they did not assist the court on the appropriate construction of section 4.8  
 Issues of discrimination under the Equality Act 2010 or any assertion that 
reasonable adjustments should be made to accommodate religion or belief 
are more appropriately addressed in the (separate and ongoing) 
employment tribunal proceedings.9 
 As there was no available evidence, the court would not address any 
argument on the risks to abortion access10 or the possible consequences11 
of any particular statutory interpretation. 
 The policy or purpose of the Abortion Act 1967 was to broaden the 
grounds for lawful abortions; to ensure patient safety via proper skill and 
hygienic conditions; and to avoid the mischief of back street abortions.  
According to Lady Hale, there was also a policy to provide the service 
within the NHS and approved clinics in the private and voluntary sectors.12 
 Sections 1 and 4 should be read together – the termination of pregnancy 
in section 1 must be the treatment referred to in section 4.13  
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 Previous case law (the RCN case14) established that what is authorised by 
the Abortion Act 1967 is the ‘whole course of medical treatment bringing 
about the ending of the pregnancy’.15 It follows that section 4 (and the right 
to object on the basis of that section) applies to the whole course of 
medical treatment bringing about the termination of the pregnancy. In 
medical abortions, it begins with the administration of the drugs and 
normally concludes with the ending of the pregnancy by expulsion of the 
foetus etc.  It includes medical and nursing care connected to the process 
of labour/giving birth and the disposal of any tissue bi products.  Lady Hale 
acknowledges there may be aftercare required as a process of birth but 
section 4 would not extend to ordinary nursing and pastoral care of a 
patient who has just given birth because ‘it was not unlawful before the 
1967 Act and thus not made lawful by it’.16 
 Completion of the statutory HSA1 forms is not covered by section 4(1) – 
the forms are a necessary precondition but are not part of the treatment 
process. Lady Hale refers to the judgement of Lord Keith in Janaway but it 
is fair to say he expresses no final opinion on this issue.17  
 A narrow meaning to the words ‘to participate in’ is more likely to have 
been in the contemplation of Parliament when the Act was passed.18 This 
interpretation would restrict the words in section 4 to those ‘actually taking 
part’ in a ‘hands-on capacity’ and relate to those acts made lawful by 
section 1.19  Ancillary, administrative and managerial tasks associated with 
those tasks are outside the acts made lawful by that section. The tasks 
carried out by the respondents were closer to the latter types of roles. 
 A conscientious objector is under an obligation to refer a patient/case/task 
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Janaway and Doogan highlight the practical difficulty of drawing the line in 
conscientious objection cases.  Janaway made it clear that conscientious 
objection did not extend beyond the confines of hospital treatment but left 
open its limits. This paper will explore the narrow interpretative choice taken 
by the Supreme Court and the manner in which that choice has been framed. 
Before doing so, we should briefly consider the alternative and broader 
construction of section 4 favoured by the Inner House namely ‘any 
involvement in the process of treatment, the object of which is to terminate a 
pregnancy’.21  This definition would not extend to all hospital employees (ie 
those with no real involvement in the process of treatment) and leaves open 
whether protection would be available for indirect provocations to conscience?  
For example, would the Inner House construction cover those engaged in the 
administrative elements of abortion treatment; or the ward receptionist who 
books in patients who might opt for an abortion? Whilst abortion opponents 
may argue (with force) that they should be protected from both direct and 
indirect provocation to their moral conscience, there are practical difficulties in 
framing that protection, particularly in the context of mixed health care 
provision.  Whatever the construction, the Act represents a compromise for 
opponents because subsection 4(2) excludes the ambit of protection in the 
context of emergency/ life threatening or grave permanent risk abortions.  
Further whether we adopt a broad or narrow approach to conscientious 
objection, there will be implications for those who work in and manage 
reproductive health care; albeit implications that the Supreme Court was not 
prepared to evaluate without evidence. 
 
Original legislative purposes  
 
Little emphasis is placed by Lady Hale on the role played by the 1967 Act in 
enabling or achieving compromise. Apart from one comment - which has 
section 4 as a ‘quid pro quo’22 for the new law - she gives the impression of a 
one-sided debate and outcome to the legislative process in 1967.  There is 
certainly no express recognition of the ‘vital strategic’ purpose played by the 
Act or by section 4 in achieving compromise back in 1967.23  According to 
Mary Neal it is: 
 
‘the compromise’ character of the Act that makes it not only possible but 
durable’24 
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It is pleasing to see the court looking for Parliament’s original intention, but 
has this been fairly represented in Lady Hale’s judgement?  She states that 
the policy of the Abortion Act was clear but her only support comes from the 
interveners and Lord Diplock in the RCN case25.  She does not appear to 
have seen any ambiguity or lack of clarity that justified the use of Hansard.  
Nor does she does mention the dissenting judgement of Lord Edmund Davies 
in the RCN case that makes it clear that the 1967 Act was: 
 
‘a product of considerable compromise between violently opposed and 
emotionally charged views. In its preamble it is described as an Act “to amend 
and clarify the law relating to termination of pregnancy by registered medical 
practitioners”, and, far from simply enlarging the existing abortion facilities, in 
the true spirit of compromise it both relaxed and restricted the existing law’ 26 
 
Diane Munday (a lobbyist who supported the Private Member’s Bill promoted 
by David Steel that ultimately became the 1967 Act) describes the legislative 
outcome as: 
 
‘The price that had to be paid for legislation at all.’27 
 
Further evidence of compromise can be found in the Parliamentary debate 
that ultimately produced the legislation.28 David Steel also talks of the 
compromises made to get the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill through 
Parliament.29  Clearly compromise was a feature of the legislative process 
and the final Act.   
 
Lady Dorrian states in her judgement for the Inner House that: 
 
‘the right of conscientious objection is given out of respect for those 
convictions (moral and religious) and not for any other reason’ 30 
 
Lady Hale does not address this point beyond the brief reference to ‘quid pro 
quo’31.  Was section 4(1) introduced to protect individuals from conflicts with 
their perceived moral responsibilities;32 as a means to object to what were 
criminal acts; out of respect for different beliefs;33 or simply as a mechanism 
to achieve compromise?34 This is a point that required resolution by the Court 
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 reading of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill in the House of Commons, 
David Steel stated: ‘To deal with the substance of her argument, it is true that the profession 
because original purpose cannot be disconnected from statutory construction. 
Is it legitimate and consistent for our highest courts to take a broad non-literal 
interpretation to section 1 (to accommodate medical advances not specifically 
envisaged in 1967),35 and a narrow interpretation to the scope of section 4? 
The interpretation in Doogan stands or falls on the correctness of the courts’ 
view on original parliamentary purpose and, in that respect, there must be 
some doubt. Compromise was an essential feature of the legislative process 
that created the 1967 Act and it should not have been ignored in the 





Despite these criticisms, it is not surprising that the court concluded that 
sections 1 and 4 had to be given a synergistic interpretation. The poor drafting 
in the original act (mixing terminates, terminated, termination and treatment) 
and the earlier decision in the RCN case36, made that outcome more likely. 
However, there are consequences for requiring the two sections to be read 
together. Restricting section 4 to the ‘acts made lawful by section 1’37 
provides simplicity but only if the law was clear and certain before the 1967 
Act.  Such an interpretation restricts section 4 to those acts that were unlawful 
before the Act and made lawful following implementation of the statutory 
regime.  By example, Lady Hale states: 
 
‘Ordinary nursing and pastoral care of a patient who has just given birth was 
not unlawful before the 1967 Act and thus not made lawful by it’ 38 
 
Mary Neal argues that the law relating to abortion was not in a state of clarity 
before 1967 and varied depending on where you were in the UK?39  The 
introductory text of the original Abortion Act 1967 supports her view on 
ambiguity: 
 
‘An Act to amend and clarify the law relating to termination of pregnancy by 
registered medical practitioners’ 
 
If the law was clear, why would the Act purport to clarify it?  Both the 
judgements of Lord Diplock and Lord Edmund Davies in the RCN case40 lend 
credence to the view that the law was unclear.  Further support can be found 
in Hansard in the debates on the original version of the bill supported by Lord 
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Silkin41.  Lord Denning notably commented in the Bill’s second reading in the 
House of Lords: 
 
‘My lords, the law as at present known is quite uncertain, in regard to doctors 
at least’ 
 
At the second reading of his Private Members Bill in the House of Commons 
on 22 Jul 1966, David Steel said: 
 
 ‘there is total uncertainty about the exact legal position. It is left far too much 
to the judgment of individual practitioners whether they are or are not within 
the law.’ 
 
The different sources of criminal law – statutory in England, Wales & Northern 
Ireland and the common law in Scotland – and the jurisdictional application of 
the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, make it likely that legal variations did 
exist within England, Wales & Scotland in 196742. 
 
So what does this mean for section 4?  According to the Supreme Court, it 
can only apply and provide objection to acts that were unlawful prior to the 
1967 Act. If there were differences before the Act, then those differences 
endure for the purposes of section 4.  If there was uncertainty before the Act, 
then uncertainty remains as to the scope of section 4.  This is a rather 
unsatisfactory situation.   An alternative interpretation would be that section 4 
applies to acts that section 1 says are lawful irrespective of whether they were 
lawful or not pre 1967.  Such an approach addresses any prior lack of clarity, 
jurisdictional variation and is consistent with the view that the Abortion Act 






The court’s interpretation means that section 4 does not extend to the signing 
of the HSA1 statutory forms that record the opinion of the authorising 
doctors.43  In Janaway, Lord Keith said: 
 
‘It does not appear whether or not there are any circumstances under which a 
doctor might be under any legal duty to sign a green form, so as to place in 
difficulties one who had a conscientious objection to doing so. The fact that 
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43 Doogan (n1) at para 36 
during the 20 years that the Act of 1967 has been in force no problem seems 
to have surfaced in this connection may indicate that in practice none exists. 
So I do not think it appropriate to express any opinion on the matter.’44 
 
The Court in Doogan appeared to be content with the (usual) practice to 
permit conscientious objection in this context via contract.  It is, nonetheless, 
an oddity that the authorisation stage is not covered by section 4.  Again was 
that Parliament’s original intention?  David Steel said during the second 
reading of his bill that: 
 
‘There is also nothing in the Bill which compels a Catholic patient or a Catholic 
doctor to be in any way involved in the termination of a pregnancy’45 
 
The emphasis is mine but clearly demonstrates the view of the Bill’s supporter 
at that stage of the legislative debate.46 
 
 
Alternative routes to conscientious objection 
 
The uncertainty presented by this judgement extends beyond the 1967 Act.  
By declining to address the human rights issues, and, by highlighting 
alternative routes to claim conscience-based objections, the Court has added 
rather than reduced legal uncertainty.  It also creates a potential burden of 
employers in this field (see below).  Although Parliament will have been aware 
of Convention rights in 1967, it is doubtful that they envisaged alternative legal 
routes to conscientious objection beyond section 4.  If Parliament intended 
that the section should encompass all the objections to ‘participation’, as well 
as enabling agreement, is there not a risk that the majority approach47 could 
unbalance the terms of that compromise? Of course, part of that risk now 
exists because of Parliament - directly or indirectly via the enactment of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010. 
 
There is also an added complication here.  The Court emphasised the duty of 
a state employer (here the NHS) to respect employee rights and, presumably, 
had in mind section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.  The corollary is the 
absence of any directly enforceable duty on non-state employers (those 
engaged in the voluntary or private provision of abortion services).  It is 
doubtful that Parliament had these variables in mind when they enacted 
section 1(3) in 1967 or the subsequent amendments to the Abortion Act.48  
 
The court also highlights the statutory duty under the Equality Act 2010 on all 
employers to refrain from direct or unjustified indirect discrimination against 
employees on the ground of their religion or belief.  Again it is arguable 
whether Parliament had this type of discrimination in mind in 1967 and prior to 
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substantive statutory protection against discrimination in the workplace.  The 
reference to reasonable adjustments49 acknowledges the potential for 
challenges following the decision in Eweida v UK.50   
 
The key point is that this judgement highlights and tacitly endorses the use of 
alternative means of pursuing conscience based objections outside the terms 
of the 1967 Act and the original terms of compromise and does so in relation 
to a class of employees - those engaged in ancillary, administrative and 
managerial tasks - which they say Parliament had not intended to cover under 
section 4.  So in effect the Court is acknowledging the scope to unsettle the 
original terms of compromise. 
 
Other employment considerations 
 
At first blush, this appears to be a good outcome for employers in this sector.  
Certainly it has been welcomed by the British Pregnancy Advisory Service 
(BPAS), one of the interveners in the case: 
 
‘"We welcome this ruling. BPAS supports the right to refuse to work in abortion care, not least 
because women deserve better than being treated by those who object to their choice. But 
the law as it stands already provides healthcare workers with these protections. Extending 
this protection to tasks not directly related to the abortion would be to the detriment of women 
needing to end a pregnancy and the healthcare staff committed to providing that care. There 
are enough barriers in the way of women who need an abortion without further obstacles 
being thrown in their way.” ‘51 
 
One of the issues raised by the interveners was that a broad construction of 
section 4 (and ’participating in’) would put at risk the accessibility to 
abortion.52  Although the court found that they did not have the evidence to 
resolve this issue, the employment implications of the judgement are worthy 
of consideration.  Mary Neal addresses the risks of a narrow construction in 
her commentary on the Inner House decision;53 her points ranging from the 
imposition of employee burden; the need for objection on a task by task basis, 
to isolation and vulnerability in the work place.  I will concentrate on her ‘task 
by task’ point and do so because of the guidance provided by Lady Hale.54   
She tests her analysis against the tasks performed by the respondents and 
the outcome was that most of the duties (but depending on context not 
necessary all) fell outside the protection of section 4.  The court’s analysis 
reinforces Neal’s argument that a narrow construction requires employees 
and employers to consider - and in the case of employees to assert - 
objections on a task by task basis.  This is an onerous obligation for both 
parties, although in light of the Eweida decision,55 the burden probably falls 
more heavily on the employer to accommodate religion/belief or to justify why 
                                            
49
 Doogan (n1) at para 24 
50





 Doogan (n1) at para 26 
53
 Neal (n23) at 418-419 
54
 Doogan (n1) at para 39 
55
 Eweida  (n50) 
it is not reasonable/proportionate in relation to a particular task.  Despite 
stating that these are matters more suited for resolution by the employment 
tribunal, Lady Hale gives us a flavour of where the ultimate balance may fall.  
In the context of family support, she says: 
 
‘it may be reasonable to expect an employer to accommodate an employee’s 
objections, in the interest of providing the family with the most effective 
service’56 
 
So the reality may not be as straightforward as employers may hope for. 
 
The judgement also highlights an interesting employment practice allegedly 
adopted by BPAS to address the issue of ‘conscientious objection’.57  
According to Lady Hale they refuse to employ anyone who has any 
conscientious objection to abortion – on the basis that the lack of such 
objection is a genuine occupational qualification (OQ) for the jobs they offer. 
Presumably BPAS do so because they are confident that: 
 
1. A substantive and core component of those jobs relate to the 
termination of pregnancy;  
2. That any asserted OQ does not amount to a contractual or ‘legal 
requirement’ to participate within the meaning section 4(1) Abortion 
Act 1967; 
3. The OQ is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.  
 
Points 1 and 3 are interlinked.  Whilst it may be relatively easy for BPAS to 
demonstrate a legitimate aim, establishing proportionate means is likely be 
more challenging for a mixed role involving tasks not related to abortion. 
 
 
Duty to refer 
 
In her concluding remarks, Lady Hale states: 
 
‘the conscientious objector be under an obligation to refer the case to a 
professional who does not share that objection…another health care 
professional should be found who does not share the objection’.58 
 
This duty goes further than the latest General Medical Council Guidance: 
 
‘You must explain to patients if you have a conscientious objection to a 
particular procedure.  You must tell them about their right to see another 
doctor and make sure they have enough information to exercise that right…If 
it is not practical for a patient to arrange to see another doctor, you must 
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make sure that arrangements are made for another suitably qualified 
colleague to take over your role’.59 
 
According to this guidance, the duty of referral is a conditional one (dependent 
on practicality) and extends only to the provision of a  ‘suitably qualified’ 
colleague.  According to Lady Hale, the obligation is an absolute one and 
extends to finding a colleague who does not share their objection to the 
procedure.  Is she envisaging that medical professionals must investigate and 
challenge the moral views of colleagues prior to referral?  What about the 
professionals who privately object to abortion on moral grounds but are willing 
to participate in the context of their professional lives.  It is unclear whether 
Lady Hale is saying that such individuals are excluded because she does not 
distinguish between those who hold opinions and those who manifest their 
beliefs in practice.  This has important implications for healthcare workers and 
required more discussion than was afforded in the judgement. 
 
 
Terminations in multiple pregnancies  
 
Lady Hale refers to the 1990 amendments60 that introduced the possibility of 
‘selective abortion’ and defines it as: 
 
‘Where a woman is carrying more than one foetus, either in order to abort a 
foetus which may be seriously handicapped or because the reduction in the 
number of fetuses she is carrying is justified on one of the other grounds’61 
 
She goes onto make reference to ‘selective reduction in the number of 
fetuses’.62  It is interesting that no terminological distinction is being made 
between terminations of anomalous and healthy foetal life.  The scientific 
literature reveals confusion and inconsistency in this context and so her 
language is of some interest.63  Further, the term ‘selective’ - in the context of 






                                            
59
 General Medical Council, (2013), Good Medical Practice, London, GMC at para 52; see 
also the GMC (2013), Personal beliefs and medical practice, London, GMC at paras 12-16. 
60
 HFEA 1990 (n48) 
61
 Doogan (n1) at para 6 
62
 Doogan (n1) at para 8 
63
 Legendre, C-M, Moutel, G, Drouin, R, Favre, R and Bouffard, C, Differences between 
selective termination of pregnancy and fetal reduction in multiple pregnancy: a narrative 
review, Reproductive BioMedicine Online (Elsevier Science), (2013) 26 (6), 542-554 
64
 Patkos, P, Embryonic reduction, selective termination, 2003, Ultrasound Rev. Obstet. 
Gynecol., 3, 290/ Berkowitz, R. L. and Lynch, L, Selective reduction: An unfortunate 
misnomer. Obstetrics and Gynecology, 1990, 75 (5), 873-874 at 873/ FIGO Committee for the 
Ethical Aspects of Human Reproduction & Woman’s Health, Ethical Recommendations on 
multiple pregnancy and multifetal reduction, International Journal of Gynecologists & 
Ostretricians (2006), 92, 331-332 at 332 
Conclusions 
 
Whilst the result was not unexpected, Doogan show the dangers of repeat 
and ongoing interpretation of an ethical and legal compromise struck many 
years ago. This compromise mattered to those who worked tirelessly to 
achieve the legislative outcome in 1967.  This compromise was struck across 
a wide range of strongly held moral beliefs. The legacy is ill served by 
continued attempts to second-guess past intentions. The world and context 
(at least in the UK) has changed dramatically since the 1960s and the time 
has come for Parliament to revisit the compromise and the archaic criminal 
law that it sought to address.65 
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